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To examine what, if any, are the differences in how activities are coordinated within versus between firms, we conductedinterviews with 32 project managers regarding 60 projects in the offshore software services industry. Uniquely, our
projects were sampled along two dimensions: (1) colocation versus spatial distribution and (2) delivery by groups of
individuals from a single firm versus from multiple firms. Our evidence suggests that in colocated projects, the same broad
categories of coordination mechanisms are used both within and between firms. However, there is a qualitative difference
in how geographically (i.e., spatially) distributed projects are coordinated within versus between firms. Distributed projects
conducted within firms rely extensively on tacit coordination mechanisms; such mechanisms are not readily available in
between-firm projects that are spatially distributed. This difference may arise because of the lack of shared history and
lack of enforcement through common authority in the between-firm context.
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Introduction
Are interdependent activities coordinated differently
when they lie within the boundaries of a firm rather
than across them? The answer to this question has
vital implications for the lively theoretical debate around
the “knowledge-based perspective”—an approach that
views the firm as an institution that offers safeguards
against coordination problems (Conner and Prahalad
1996; Demsetz 1988; Grant 1996; Gulati et al. 2005;
Kogut and Zander 1992, 1996; Nahapiet and Ghoshal
1998; Nickerson and Zenger 2004). This paper explores
geographic (spatial) distribution or colocation of work as
a contingency that influences the nature of coordination
within- versus between-firm boundaries.
Coordination as an outcome is achieved when inter-
dependent individuals are able to act as if they can
predict each other’s actions; coordination failures occur
when interacting individuals are unable to anticipate
each other’s actions and adjust their own accord-
ingly (Puranam et al. 2012, Schelling 1960). Ineffective
communication and knowledge transfer, delays, misun-
derstandings, and poor synchronization of activity are
typical manifestations of coordination failure. In con-
trast, cooperation failures occur when interdependent
individuals face conflicting incentives; these failures
are manifested as holdup, shirking, and possibly other
forms of opportunistic behavior (Alchian and Demsetz
1972, Klein et al. 1978, Williamson 1979). Scholars
across a range of disciplines note that coordination
failures can occur even when incentives are fully aligned
(Camerer 2003, Grant 1996, Heath and Staudenmayer
2000, Holmstrom and Roberts 1998, March and Simon
1958, Schelling 1960, Simon 1947).
While addressing the same central question as do the-
ories of the firm based on economic incentives (i.e.,
why certain transactions are optimally conducted within
rather than between firms; see Coase 1937; Williamson
1975, 1985), proponents of the knowledge-based view
(KBV) deemphasize the various forms in which incen-
tive conflict may arise and instead argue that firms are
social structures that offer protection against coordina-
tion failures in unique ways that are not available in
market transactions. Examples of mechanisms that are
available only in within-firm transactions include higher
levels of shared knowledge, common language, and
higher-order organizing principles under the shadow of
common authority (Conner and Prahalad 1996; Demsetz
1988; Grant 1996; Kogut and Zander 1992, 1996). Thus
in the KBV, the discriminating alignment between trans-
actions and governance forms (Williamson 1991) occurs
not on the criteria of asset specificity and anticipated
holdup but rather on the match between the coordination
requirements of transactions and the distinctive coordi-
nation mechanisms that characterize within-firm versus
between-firm transactions (Nickerson and Zenger 2004).
Incentive-based theories, such as transaction cost eco-
nomics, are able to offer a coherent account of the
unique mechanisms by which incentive conflicts are
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mitigated or resolved within firms (e.g., through fiat and
low-power incentives). This is not true of the KBV, as
scholars have questioned the key premise that within-
firm interactions can draw on unique coordinating mech-
anisms, arguing instead that such mechanisms are also
available in between-firm transactions (Foss 1996a, b;
Grandori 1997; Grandori and Kogut 2002; Grandori and
Soda 1995; Stinchcombe 1985).1
The available empirical evidence does not allow us
to discriminate confidently between these viewpoints,
with some studies offering (at least indirect) evidence
of “differences” in within- and between-firm coordina-
tion mechanisms and others showing “no differences.”
For instance, consistent with the notion that shared orga-
nizing principles and common language confer unique
advantages to within-firm knowledge transfer processes,
Kogut and Zander (1993) find that multinational firms
are more likely to transfer complex, tacit knowledge to
their subsidiaries rather than to third parties. Almeida
et al. (2002) find that multinational firms cite their
own foreign patents more frequently than the patents of
alliance partners or those of competitors. These authors
suggest that firms have access to multiple formal and
informal practices that facilitate transfer of both codi-
fied and tacit knowledge within their boundaries and that
fewer of these mechanisms are available between firms.
In contrast, other scholars who have studied the coor-
dination mechanisms used between firms conclude that
they do not differ from those used within firms. Helper
et al. (2000) document the use of firm-like coordination
practices such as colocation of engineers and exchange
of detailed information across assemblers and suppli-
ers. Dyer (1996, 1997) and Dyer and Nobeoka (2000)
observe that within-firm-like coordination practices such
as engineer colocation, cospecialization of human capi-
tal, and strong identity and coordination rules are imple-
mented in some buyer-supplier transactions in the auto-
motive industry.
The stimulus behind the present paper is an obser-
vation about the nature of the conflicting claims in the
prior literature noted above: the empirical setting of the
no difference camp (e.g., Helper et al. 2000) tends to
be colocated buyer-supplier relationships, whereas the
empirical setting of the difference camp (e.g., Almeida
et al. 2002) consists of geographically dispersed sub-
sidiaries of multinational firms. Our goal is therefore
to understand whether colocation/spatial distribution of
work is a key contingency that the KBV has perhaps
neglected.
Theories of the firm, concerned as they are with the
issue of discriminating alignment between transaction
characteristics and governance modes, offer no direct
guidance on this question, as they are generally agnostic
to the location of activity. Yet the spatial distribution of
work is now widely recognized as an important contin-
gency that should be reflected in our theories of orga-
nizations and organizing (e.g., Hinds and Kiesler 2002,
Zammuto et al. 2007). If we find that colocation versus
spatial distribution is indeed an important contingency
that determines when the arguments of the KBV hold,
we would see this as a useful refinement of the perspec-
tive. If we find no qualitative differences in the use of
coordination mechanisms within versus between firms,
even after accounting for the contingency of colocation,
our results would add to the evidence against the KBV.
The software services offshoring industry provides
an interesting setting in which to examine our conjec-
ture about the spatial distribution/colocation of work
as a key contingency for the KBV. Wage arbitrage
between “onshore” (typically Western) and “offshore”
(e.g., India, China) locations is the principal economic
driver of this industry (Farrell 2005). Specifically, when
offshoring is accompanied by outsourcing, the eco-
nomics require a reduction in onshore headcount within
the client and vendor firms with a corresponding (but
less costly) increase in headcount offshore within the
vendor firm. Despite this compelling incentive to off-
shore, projects with zero onshore presence of vendor
employees are exceedingly rare. The typical staffing pat-
tern is such that 20%–30% of vendor employees in a
project are onshore and 70%–80% are offshore, with
almost no client employees located offshore (Informa-
tion Week 2004, Venkatesh and Krishna 2005). It appears
that there is a strong preference to coordinate work
across onshore and offshore locations between employ-
ees of the same firm (the vendor) rather than between
onshore client and offshore vendor employees. Coordi-
nating geographically distributed work is a widely rec-
ognized challenge in this industry (Cataldo et al. 2006,
Mullick et al. 2006). This suggests some surface valid-
ity for our conjecture that the advantages of within-
firm coordination may be more salient for spatially
distributed work rather than colocated work.
To investigate why and how this may be the case,
we analyze field interview data on 42 distributed and
18 colocated projects from the software services off-
shoring industry. These 60 projects were sampled along
the dimensions of cross-location and cross-firm distribu-
tion of work, allowing us to focus sharply on our con-
jecture. We chose a qualitative approach to gain greater
insight on the “how” questions that are at the center of
this study: How are coordination mechanisms different
across firm boundaries rather than within them, and how
does colocation or spatial distribution of work influence
the use of these mechanisms? Comparative case stud-
ies are useful precisely in these situations, where we
are trying to understand process questions and bound-
ary conditions in terms of their applicability (Eisenhardt
1989, Siggelkow 2007, Yin 1994). Our sample is unique
in explicitly comparing within- and between-firm coor-
dination for spatially distributed and colocated work.
Our analysis points to two main conclusions. First,
we find that for colocated projects, there is no evidence
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for coordination mechanisms that appear to be unique
to projects that comprise individuals drawn from the
same firm or from different firms. Second, for spatially
distributed projects, we do find a sharp distinction in
how work is coordinated between employees from the
same firm versus different firms. Consistent with gen-
eral trends in the industry, in our sample, offshore out-
sourcing projects always include some onshore vendor
employees. In this paper, apart from noting this distinc-
tion, we attempt to understand why this is the case.
Beyond the implications for understanding how coor-
dination occurs within and between firms, our research
has relevance to the broader organizational phenomenon
of coordination under communication constraints. Both
interdependence and communication constraints are
well-known joint consequences of specialization within
organizations (Kretschmer and Puranam 2008). In gen-
eral, “as the specialization of tasks proceeds, the inter-
dependency of the specialized parts increases” (Simon
1991, p. 42). Specialization inevitably leads to interde-
pendence and the need for coordination in the sense
that the specialized parts must eventually work together
(March and Simon 1958). However, specialization also
creates communication constraints between individuals
in specialized subunits within an organization because
they belong to distinct “thought worlds” with mutu-
ally incompatible representations, language, and inter-
personal and time orientations (Dougherty 1992, Heath
and Staudenmayer 2000, Lawrence and Lorsch 1967,
Sosa et al. 2012). Spatial distribution is but one source of
communication constraint; time pressure, cultural differ-
ences, specialization, and increasing scale may be others.
Prior Theory: Three Generic Categories of
Coordination Mechanisms
To study differences in intra- and interfirm coordination
mechanisms, it is useful to begin with a clear conception
of the various categories of coordination mechanisms.
Since all coordination ultimately takes place between
individuals (March and Simon 1958), we use the term
between-firm coordination to denote interactions involv-
ing employees from multiple firms and within-firm coor-
dination to denote interactions between employees of
a single firm. This is similar to the usage in Argyres
(1999), Takeishi (2002), and Helper et al. (2000) in their
characterization of intra- and interorganizational coordi-
nation. In our context, we treat “organization” as syn-
onymous with “firm” (as do all theories of the firm; for
instance, see Williamson 1991), though for other kinds
of research questions, we do recognize that it may be
more appropriate to treat even a firm as comprising mul-
tiple organizations.
Some level of common ground—knowledge that is
shared and known to be shared—is necessary for any
conscious attempt at coordinated action (Clark 1996,
Schelling 1960).2 Exactly how much common ground is
required may, however, vary by situation and the nature
of the coordination mechanisms employed. An exten-
sive literature identifies several coordination mechanisms
that help to create sufficient common ground for coor-
dination; these can be usefully summarized into three
generic categories: ongoing communication, modularity,
and tacit coordinating mechanisms (TCMs). Rather than
group mechanisms phenomenologically (into roles, rou-
tines, etc.), we group them such that all the mechanisms
grouped within a category work in roughly the same way
to create the conditions under which individuals suc-
cessfully coordinate actions, but the mechanisms listed
across different categories work differently in achieving
coordination.
Ongoing communication is the most intuitive and
perhaps the most potent category of mechanisms for
dynamically updating and maintaining the common
ground necessary for coordinated action (Clark 1996,
Okhuysen and Bechky 2009). Classical discussions of
“feedback” (March and Simon 1958) or “mutual adjust-
ment” (Thompson 1967) implicitly invoke the notion of
ongoing communication so as to update common ground
dynamically to achieve coordination.
Ongoing communication is more effective when it
occurs between colocated individuals, since it facili-
tates face-to-face communication in a shared social con-
text (Kraut et al. 2002, Olson and Olson 2000). Prior
work shows that ongoing communication in virtual con-
texts using information and communication technology
(ICT) is inferior to face-to-face interaction in updat-
ing common ground (De Meyer 1991, Kraut et al.
1988, McGuire et al. 1987). There is consensus that
ICT media, even videoconferencing, remain limited in
terms of bandwidth (Daft and Lengel 1986, Doherty-
Sneddon et al. 1997, O’Connail et al. 1993) and are rel-
atively ineffective in coordinating complex, ill-defined
tasks with high interdependence (for reviews, please see
Kraut et al. 2002, Olson et al. 2002).
Modularity is a second category of approaches toward
coordinating. It involves a designer who can partition
activities into modules, design interfaces between mod-
ules, and embed these interfaces into common ground
across individuals working in different modules (Simon
1962). In general terms, an interface is a description of
how the modules of a system interact with each other.
In organizations, the modules are typically interdepen-
dent units (such as project teams, divisions, or firms),
and interfaces include standard operating procedures,
design rules, plans, and schedules that specify what each
unit must do so that their actions are coordinated at
a higher level (Galbraith 1977, Tushman and Nadler
1978). Interfaces economize on the need for ongoing
communication as well as on the amount of knowl-
edge held in common ground. If designed well, knowl-
edge of the interface in common ground is sufficient
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to achieve coordinated action across subunits (Baldwin
and Clark 2000, Simon 1962, Ulrich and Eppinger 1999)
because cross-module dependencies are primarily man-
aged through interfaces, limiting the need for ongoing
communication. Thus, whereas ongoing communication
constantly updates common ground, modularity involves
working with a minimal, constant level of common
ground that is embedded in the interface.
When the pattern of interdependence between tasks is
unknown or changing, as is typical in innovative work,
modular approaches to coordination may be limited,
because well-specified interfaces cannot be designed
ex ante (Ethiraj and Levinthal 2004, Okhuysen and
Bechky 2009, Thompson 1967, Tushman and Nadler
1978). Under these conditions, coordination may require
recourse to ongoing communication (March and Simon
1958, Scott 2003, Thompson 1967, Tushman and
Nadler 1978). For example, Pentland and Reuter (1994)
describe how ongoing communication was part of the
routine for dealing with “exception” cases in a helpdesk
system. Jarzabkowski et al. (2011) discuss the role of
intensive ongoing communication in coordinating when
old routines were no longer adequate to coordinate in
changed circumstances.
Modularity and ongoing communication as two
generic alternatives to coordinating work reflect well-
established distinctions between coordination by plan
versus feedback (Galbraith 1977, March and Simon
1958, Thompson 1967, Tushman and Nadler 1978),
modular versus integral designs (Baldwin and Clark
2000, Sanchez and Mahoney 1996), and loose versus
tight coupling (Orton and Weick 1990).
Recent work also highlights a third generic approach
to coordination that relies primarily on tacit coordi-
nation. TCMs help to achieve coordination in situa-
tions of high interdependence in a tacit manner—without
recourse to explicit ongoing communication or through
construction of modular interfaces. Instead, TCMs work
in two broad ways: (a) by leveraging preexisting com-
mon ground that may not be specific to the task at hand
and (b) by building common ground through observa-
tion of the work context, and actions and outcomes,
rather than direct communication (Clark 1996, Cramton
2001, Gutwin et al. 2004). Leveraging shared experi-
ences from having worked together on past projects is
an instance of the former; this can often be built through
rotating employees through the organization (Ghoshal
et al. 1994, Nohria and Ghoshal 1997). Observing the
progress of work by working side by side is an instance
of the latter.
The literature shows that TCMs play an important
role even in colocated work when ongoing communica-
tion is in theory feasible (Bechky 2006, Faraj and Xiao
2006). Mere proximity improves coordination because
common ground is enhanced through being rooted in a
shared social context, such as in the same room, and
the use of shared artifacts (Kraut et al. 2002, Olson and
Olson 2000, Olson et al. 2002). Okhuysen and Bechky
(2009), in their review of prior work on different coor-
dination mechanisms, emphasize that TCMs such as the
use of boundary objects, shared representations, and task
contexts improve the effectiveness of ongoing communi-
cation, and they help to achieve coordination even in sit-
uations where communication is constrained by enabling
accountability, predictability, and shared understanding
among the interdependent actors. Srikanth and Puranam
(2011) use survey data from a sample of offshore-
outsourced business processes to show that TCMs can be
distinguished empirically from the other two classes of
coordination mechanisms (ongoing communication and
modularity) and that they mitigate the adverse impact
on process performance arising from interdependence in
spatially distributed work.
Tacit coordination must not be confused with tacit
knowledge, or indeed with unintended (emergent) coor-
dination. Tacit coordination mechanisms leverage shared
knowledge—knowledge that may be tacit or explicit—to
achieve coordination without the need for ongoing com-
munication (Camerer 2003, Schelling 1960, Srikanth
and Puranam 2011). For example, in Schelling’s (1960)
experiments, focal points are explicit knowledge, but
they allow tacit coordination—coordination without the
need for communicating. The moniker tacit in tacit coor-
dination signifies that ongoing communication is not
necessary. Tacit knowledge, on the other hand, involves
situations where ongoing communication is not sufficient
for knowledge transfer. Tacit coordination may be quite
deliberate and may draw on deliberately created or pre-
existing shared knowledge.
Although the three categories of coordination mecha-
nisms described above are very well established in the
literature, the present study examines how firm bound-
aries influence the usage (and existence) of these three
generic categories of coordination mechanisms, with
particular attention to whether (and why) differences
(if any) are more salient for distributed rather than colo-
cated work.
Methodology
We use data from field interviews to understand how and
why within-firm coordination differs from between-firm
coordination for two reasons. First, qualitative method-
ologies are useful when different theories attempt to
explain the same question and empirical evidence is
mixed; this condition typically implies a need to uncover
the contingencies or boundary conditions where the dif-
ferent arguments apply (Eisenhardt and Graebner 2007,
Siggelkow 2007). Quantitative methods are less appro-
priate in such settings, since the nature of prior theory
development does not allow us to build robust hypotheses
that the large sample data are meant to test (Miles and
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Huberman 1994). Second, whereas quantitative method-
ologies (such as analysis of data from surveys; e.g.,
Srikanth and Puranam 2011) may be useful to under-
standing whether there are differences in the usage of
coordination mechanisms between and within firms, they
are unlikely to shed as much light on questions of why
these differences exist.
Our empirical strategy involves sampling cases in each
cell in a 2 × 2 fully crossed design, where the cells
identify projects crossing firm and/or geographic bound-
aries (see Figure 1). We choose this design because prior
work tends to focus on projects that are colocated ver-
sus distributed or to compare projects conducted within
versus across firm boundaries, but not both (Dibbern
et al. 2008, Helper et al. 2000). Our sample uniquely
includes both dimensions, enabling us to contrast mech-
anisms used by firms to bridge coordination challenges
within and across firm boundaries in both colocated and
distributed settings.
Site Selection
Since we are interested in understanding how coordina-
tion mechanisms differ across both firm and geographic
boundaries, we needed access to research sites conduct-
ing a broad variety of projects across the four cells
in Figure 1. We interviewed 32 project managers from
two large software services providers, one headquartered
in the United States and the other in India. The U.S.
firm, which we call Integrator, is a large software ser-
vices vendor well known for delivering globally dis-
tributed projects for its multinational clients. The Indian
firm, which we call Process Master, is a pioneer in
the offshore software services industry in India and has
been very successful over the past decade in deliver-
ing large global solutions. Both firms increasingly work
Figure 1 Project Sampling Strategy
Developers belong to single firm
Yes No
Project
personnel
colocated
in one
location
Cell 1
Projects in which all developers
(and analysts) work in the same
location and all developers are
employed by the vendor.
8 projects
Cell 3
Projects in which all developers (and
analysts) work in the same location,
but some members are employees of
the vendor and others employees of
the client or other firms.
10 projects
Project
personnel
distributed
among
several
locations
Cell 2
Projects conducted by the vendor
where all developers (and
analysts) are employed by the
vendor, but they work from
several locations (both onshore
and offshore).
22
 
projects
Cell 4
Projects in which developers and
analysts work in different locations
(project has both onshore and
offshore components) and some staff
members are employees of vendor,
whereas others are employees of clients
or other firms.
20 projects
with partners in their projects, including with each other
(though not in our sample). Also, both firms increas-
ingly compete for similar projects, thus making com-
parisons between them potentially insightful. We expect
to observe differences in the way these firms manage
projects, and by generating variety in the research sites,
we hope to understand the boundary conditions of our
findings (Yin 1994). Each firm provided information on
30 projects.
Case Selection
We interviewed project managers for software devel-
opment or maintenance projects who had experience
in managing at least two of the modes of organizing
projects in our 2 × 2 sampling frame. This sampling
strategy is particularly relevant for our research question,
which calls for comparisons across cells. Based on these
criteria, our prime contacts in both firms (at the level of
country heads) nominated managers to meet with us.
The sample consists of 48 development and 12 main-
tenance projects. Development projects are those where
a client organization hires a vendor to create new soft-
ware to provide some specified functionality. These
are susceptible to changing patterns of interdependence
because of changes in requirements, as well as unknown
interactions between components that only come to light
at a later stage. Maintenance projects, on the other hand,
involve ongoing support and upkeep of preexisting sys-
tems. Maintenance projects may not require as much
creative effort in design as development projects, but
they do involve difficult coordination episodes around
the need to quickly resolve problems across sites with
information technology (IT) systems that are critical to
the organization.
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Data Collection and Analysis
We gathered data primarily from field interviews of
expert informants, similar to Uzzi (1997). To understand
how software development and maintenance activities
are coordinated, we believe that project managers are
the most relevant expert informants. They are uniquely
responsible for defining the formal coordination mecha-
nisms to be used in a project, and they are responsible
for coordinating across geographic and firm boundaries.
Project managers are better able than other participants
to provide information on the entire life cycle of the
project: the architecture phase, the development phase,
and the change requests and delivery phase. Since cross-
case comparison is essential to our design, we inter-
viewed only managers who had experience in at least
two of the four cells.
This study was conducted in three phases. In the first
phase, as a pilot, we interviewed managers from four
projects who are not part of this sample to identify
the issues and phases that we should focus on during
data collection. Based on these pilot interviews, we pre-
pared a list of questions to serve as a guide for the
semistructured interviews in the main study (available in
the appendix).
In the second phase of data collection, we interviewed
project managers who could address their experiences
in two specific (named) projects. Each project was in a
different cell in our design. Our sponsors in the orga-
nizations identified the most appropriate managers with
whom to speak. We contacted them with a short state-
ment describing the purpose of our research and a short
list of the types of questions we would ask to enable
them to assemble secondary material. In essence, the
Table 1 Description of Analysis Phases
Case write-up outputs Application to case
Level 1 (descriptive case) Based on the interviews, each project was written up into a case study describing the characteristics of the
project, the architectural decisions to determine modularity, and the coordination episodes involving
development and change management.
Level 2 (diagnostic case) The data were broken down into the following key dimensions:
1. Steps taken to achieve modular solutions across locations and any constraints to achieving such
solutions
2. Steps taken to achieve rich communication across locations and any constraints to enabling such
communication
3. Extent of communication using “poor” media across locations
4. Any other solutions to achieve coordination
Level 3 (theoretical case) • In-depth content analysis of data in the three categories of coordination.
• Multiple iterations through the “other” coordination mechanisms to identify common threads and noting
differences.
• Iteration through the cases to develop theoretical clarity.
• Preparation of analytic displays, checklist matrices, etc., especially with respect to project descriptives
(e.g., size, complexity, performance) to understand boundary conditions.
• Iteration of comparison between colocated and distributed projects to understand similarities and
differences.
• Comparison of three coordination techniques (modularity, ongoing communication, and TCM) to
understand micromechanisms and develop theoretical underpinnings.
• Link to broader literature.
managers were asked to describe and compare the coor-
dination mechanisms used in the two projects across the
two cells and to explain why various choices were made.
The project manager interviews lasted between 60 and
180 minutes. Twenty-eight of the 32 interviews were
recorded (with permission) and transcribed. We also
took extensive notes during the interviews, which were
typed up the same day along with any field observa-
tions. In many instances, the respondents drew diagrams
and charts to explain concepts, and they provided us
with copies of documents, slides, and templates used in
their firms. Some managers were contacted again for any
needed clarifications.
In the third phase, analysis of the evidence pro-
ceeded by iteration and in tandem with the second
phase. Table 1 describes the process of case write-up
and analysis. Both researchers read the interview tran-
scripts and discussed emerging ideas and themes, which
were subsequently incorporated in the additional inter-
views to achieve greater understanding of these con-
cepts. For example, we were unaware of a category of
tools called “workflow” tools; after encountering these
tools in two projects, we specifically asked managers
in subsequent interviews about these tools. Another was
the phrase “investing in process.” Once the major con-
ceptual themes were identified from the content anal-
ysis, we read and reread interview transcripts to link
the evidence to recurring themes and to understand rela-
tionships between the themes. Finally, we compared our
framework with published theory to understand how our
results add to the understanding of coordination within
and between firms.
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Findings
Table 2 shows the use of the three generic categories
of coordination mechanisms across the different types
of projects in our sample. In the first stage of the anal-
ysis, we counted the number of projects in each cell
that relied significantly on achieving modular solutions
as evidence of attempts to use modularization as a coor-
dination device. Similarly, we counted the number of
projects that used rich communication technology, such
as videoconferencing (in a handful of projects) and poor
communication technology, such as email and telephone
(in all projects), for ongoing communication. All colo-
cated projects relied heavily on ongoing face-to-face
communication. Distributed projects that invested heav-
ily in travel between locations were also coded as using
ongoing face-to-face communication. Finally, projects
that emphasized leveraging TCMs, such as leveraging
shared coding procedures or tools that generated com-
mon ground across the project, were coded as using
TCMs.
Our objective is to compare whether (a) different coor-
dination mechanisms are used in within- versus between-
firm projects and (b) spatial colocation or distribution
is a contingency that influences how within- versus
between-firm projects are coordinated. From Table 2,
there are several interesting patterns that require further
explanation:
1. There appears to be no major difference in the
coordination mechanisms used in colocated projects
organized within firms (cell 1) versus between firms
(cell 3).
a. All eight cell 1 and ten cell 3 projects relied
heavily on ongoing face-to-face communication to
achieve coordination. None of the projects relied on rich
Table 2 Coordination Mechanisms Used Across Geographic
and Firm Boundaries
Coordinating mechanisms (%)
Total Face-to- Rich Poor
Cell projects Modularity face ICT ICT TCM
Cell 1 (same 8 0 100 0 100 12.5
firm, same
location)
Cell 2 (same 22 14 18 18 100 82
firm, different
locations)
Cell 3 (different 10 30 100 0 100 0
firms, same
location)
Cell 4 (different 20 35 95 0 100 5a
firms, different
locations)
aIn this project, most client personnel were former employees
of the vendor, who already had much experience with the ven-
dor’s processes. Thus, from a common ground perspective, it may
be dubious to treat this case as an example of tacit coordination
between firms.
ICT such as videoconferencing, and all relied on poor
ICT, such as email.
b. Only one of eight cell 1 projects also used TCMs
to coordinate, whereas none of these ten cell 3 projects
used TCMs to coordinate.
c. None of the eight cell 1 projects relied on mod-
ular solutions to coordinate, whereas only three of the
ten cell 3 projects used modular solutions to coordinate.
2. In distributed projects, within-firm coordination
(cell 2) appears to be achieved qualitatively differently
from between-firm coordination (cell 4), as shown in
bold in Table 2. Specifically,
a. Only 4 of 22 (18%) cell 2 projects rely on
face-to-face communication, but 19 of 20 (95%) cell 4
projects do so.
b. As a mirror image to the above, coordination in
18 of 22 (82%) cell 2 projects relies mainly on TCMs,
whereas only 1 of 20 (5%) between-firm (cell 4) projects
relies mainly on TCMs.
These differences by themselves are not the key find-
ings of this work. The projects we studied are not a
representative sample, and therefore we cannot use our
data to make generalizable statements about how coordi-
nation is achieved in this industry. Rather, we use these
projects as a stimulus to return to the interviews in the
subsequent rounds of coding to attempt to understand
why these patterns may exist. Below we explain why we
think we see these patterns in coordination mechanisms
across the different types of projects.
Finding 1: The Same Coordination Mechanisms
Are Used Both in Within- and Between-Firm
Projects That Are Colocated
In our data, we observe that both within- and between-
firm colocated projects rely extensively on ongoing com-
munication and copresence to achieve coordination, but
not on other TCMs or on creating modular solutions.
Ongoing communication was the most important
coordination mechanism used within firms. Respondents
in cell 1 (see Figure 1) typically pointed out that “we
are all in the same location and developers communi-
cate with each other all the time.” When speaking about
coordination episodes, others described “walking over
to the other cubicle” or “pulling together people in a
room real quick.” All eight colocated projects conducted
within a single firm (cell 1) emphasized the importance
of communication. For example,
Loose interaction was sufficient for achieving coordina-
tion in this project; we did not have to invest much in
processes. Here, one has the ability to walk over and
interrupt another person over a question. In this project,
coordination mostly occurs by informal communication.
(Integrator Manager 18, Project 34)
Ongoing communication was also an important coor-
dination mechanism between firms in projects delivered
from the same location (cell 3). For example,
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There was a lot of ad hoc communication between
the developers; they were all located in the same
floor. 6When in need of clarification or coordination
between developers7, documentation or any information
exchanged could either have been emailed, which I’d say
is probably uncommon; the most common is probably
just get up and talk to them because they’re all in the
same area so it was very easy to communicate informally.
(Integrator Manager 15, Project 28)
Our interviews suggest that ongoing face-to-face com-
munication was the most important coordination mecha-
nism used in both within-firm and between-firm projects.
Modularity as a coordination device was attempted
in every project, but typically it was not sufficient for
achieving coordination. The managers in our sample rec-
ognized that if they could divide work such that there
were few interdependencies across modules, coordina-
tion would be easier. In all projects in our sample, man-
agers made some effort to create code modules to the
extent possible. However, changing requirements, unex-
pected interdependencies, idiosyncratic system features,
and “legacy” (old technology) issues prevented effective
modularization in both development and maintenance
projects. Figure 2 shows the level of interdependence
between firms and between locations in our sample.
None of the eight within-firm, colocated projects
(cell 1) relied extensively on modularization in the
sense of using thin interfaces between modules. In other
words, though the developers could be working on dif-
ferent kinds of code, such as graphical user interface
and server, there was enough unstructured interaction
between them that, for our analytical purposes, they
could be considered as working on a single module.
Figure 2 Mapping Interdependence Across Cells
Developers belong to single firm
Yes No
Project
personnel
colocated
in one
location
Cell 1 (8 projects)
Interdependence across locations:
N/A
Interdependence across firms:
N/A
Cell 3 (10 projects)
Interdependence across locations:
N/A
Interdependence across firms:
High: 7
Low: 3
Project
personnel
distributed
among
several
locations
Cell 2 (22 projects)
Interdependence across locations:
High: 19
Low: 3
Interdependence across firms:
N/A
Cell 4 (20 projects)
Interdependence across locations:
High: 19
Low: 1
Interdependence across firms:
High: 13
Low: 7
Modularity was not a very important mechanism to
coordinate work between firms either. Managers in all
the 10 colocated between-firm projects (cell 3) invested
in modularization. However, in none of these cases
was coordination between the client and vendor firm
achieved by relying primarily on modularity. In some
cases, the client engaged more than one vendor in a
project. These vendors in our sample typically had dif-
ferent competences and worked on different aspects of
the project that were not highly interdependent with
each other. In these cases, the different vendor firms had
few interactions among themselves. In our sample, three
of the ten cell 3 projects showed this pattern, which
could be thought of as examples of modular coordination
between the vendor firms, though these were the conse-
quence of low interdependence ex ante, not structuring
of interdependence into well-designed interfaces.
This pattern of the limited use of modularity in our
context is consistent with prior work. Several scholars
have pointed out that in typical outsourcing projects,
intermodule dependencies are irreducibly high and unsta-
ble through the life cycle of the project (Cataldo et al.
2006, Herbsleb and Mockus 2003, Kraut and Streeter
1995), and the up-front investment in creating a modular
structure may not be feasible. It is notable that recent
empirical work in offshoring also does not advocate a
modular approach to minimize hidden costs (Dibbern
et al. 2008).
Tacit coordination mechanisms were used in all
colocated (within- and between-firm) projects. These
primarily involved taking advantage of shared physical
copresence, which enabled project members to easily
observe each other’s actions and outcomes. For exam-
ple, one manager told us how being colocated allowed
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for resolution of a problem through use of a mutually
visible “demo” (demonstration), rather than attempting
to explain the problem over email.
This project was done with bleeding-edge technology,
using NAS 6technology name7. There were a lot of bugs
in it 6in NAS7. We were all sitting together in 6location7.
If it had been in India, and we go back and tell 6the
client7 that the implementation is incorrect in NAS, it
would have been extremely difficult for us to demon-
strate it 0 0 0 there would be emails, and 0 0 0 they might have
misinterpreted it. But the colocation there greatly helped
because we demoed, straightaway we demoed 0 0 0 [the
client] asked why can’t you do a small example, and we
wrote it. It was very interactive, 6client7 designers were
sitting next to us, so in that way, we did not need to
explain; it was self-obvious to the 6client7 person right
there because they could see it as it was happening. (Pro-
cess Master Manager 23, Project 43)
Similarly, within-firm, colocated projects also relied
on copresence to coordinate, as documented in the liter-
ature (Olson and Olson 2000, Olson et al. 2002).
In sum, we find no evidence in our sample for a
coordination mechanism unique to the within-firm or
between-firm context in colocated projects, which agrees
with some published findings (e.g., Helper et al. 2000).
Finding 2: In Distributed Projects, Within-Firm
Coordination Relies Mainly on TCMs, But
Between-Firm Coordination Does Not
In spatially distributed projects conducted within a single
firm (cell 2), cross-location coordination was achieved
mainly by leveraging TCMs in 18 of the 22 projects
(or in 82% of cases). However, in projects that were
spatially distributed and conducted across multiple firms
(cell 4), coordination between firms across locations was
achieved mainly by leveraging TCMs in only 1 out of the
20 projects (or in 5% of the cases). Even in this project,
the client firm hired many vendor employees, who now
interacted with their former colleagues. Conversely, only
18% of cell 2 projects relied on ongoing face-to-face
communication, whereas 95% of cell 4 projects did so
to coordinate between employees of different firms. This
suggests that in distributed projects, there is a significant
difference in how coordination is achieved in within-
versus between-firm contexts; we examine the reasons
for this below.
By definition, ongoing face-to-face communication is
not possible in distributed projects, and ongoing travel
between locations to maintain such communication is
very expensive.
Limited Reliance on Ongoing Communication Using
ICT Tools. Ongoing communication using ICT tools
appears to be distinctly less attractive compared with
face-to-face interaction, even within a single firm. From
Table 2, we observe that few distributed projects, within
or between firms, used rich ICT tools in our sample.
These findings resonate with prior work, which suggests
that ICT tools are not as effective as face-to-face com-
munication for two reasons. First, current ICT technolo-
gies, even videoconferencing, cannot match the bene-
fits of colocation, such as shared contextual information
and frequent, rich interactions, which are necessary to
transfer the complex and difficult-to-articulate informa-
tion required for coordinating software services delivery
(for reviews, please see Kraut et al. 2002, Olson et al.
2002). Second, the usefulness of rich ICT media such
as videoconferencing is limited in distributed settings
because they require copresence—the need for all partic-
ipants to simultaneously attend the meeting. In offshore
software services, time-zone differences make such cop-
resence very difficult to manage (e.g., Armstrong and
Cole 2002).
TCMs Substitute for ICT-Based Ongoing Communica-
tion in Within-Firm Projects. To successfully coordinate
projects across locations, distributed projects need an
effective substitute for ongoing, rich face-to-face com-
munication. In our data, it appears that within-firm dis-
tributed projects (cell 2) leveraged TCMs as an effective
substitute for communicating. Specifically, in our sam-
ple, of the 22 projects organized in cell 2, 14 leveraged
preexisting stocks of common ground, and 18 projects
made an effort to generate common ground on an ongo-
ing basis in a tacit manner. We observed two specific
mechanisms: (1) leveraging preexisting common ground
by adhering to commonly agreed (standardized) coding
processes across different locations and (2) generating
common ground on an ongoing basis by using tools
that made actions, contexts, and outcomes visible across
locations.
1. Working to standardized procedures. Working to
standardized procedures was one of the most impor-
tant sources of preexisting common ground in our
intrafirm distributed projects. The capability maturity
model (CMM),3 which firms follow in developing soft-
ware, is one example of a standardized work process
that we frequently encountered in our study. Our respon-
dents explained that working to standardized processes
mitigated coordination problems because they regulated
what information was required to be transmitted, as well
as provided guidelines on how this information would be
interpreted and used. For example, because of the limi-
tations of natural language, one coder cannot in general
read code/documentation written by another coder with-
out the need for disambiguation (Janicki et al. 1977).
Adherence to commonly known standardized processes
helps these interdependent coders to both generate the
expected information and understand that information as
it was intended. As one manager put it, working to stan-
dardized processes ensures the following:
Do you understand what I am giving to you and how
do you understand it, and it validates what is being cre-
ated is in accordance to this understanding. (Integrator
Manager 16, Project 30)
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Another manager explained why the use of commonly
agreed processes helps coordinate actions in distributed
projects:
You have to follow something that is shared, and shared
everywhere, in every component of the project, so you
need absolutely to have this kind of backbone. Other-
wise, you risk to be not understood by the other or mis-
understood or not provide what is needed, anything can
happen. (Integrator Manager 25, Project 47)
In these projects, standardized processes are in com-
mon ground—they are known to everyone, and because
project managers ensure that they are followed, everyone
also knows that everyone will follow them. The great-
est advantage of this type of standardization comes from
the ability to perform work (code in this case) in the
certainty that the interdependent other will work in a
known way, and hence their actions may be anticipated
and accommodated. Interestingly, the process need not
be optimally designed for a project to still be useful,
as long as it is commonly used. As Schelling (1960)
noted, a focal point that arises in one transaction can
still be used as a coordination device in an unrelated
transaction.4
Several managers pointed to the lack of standardized
processes as the main reason for coordination problems
in their distributed projects. For example, one manager,
speaking about a poor coordination episode, suggested
the following:
Developers do not code to adhere to a standard; they
code to get the job done. 6In this project7 there were 60-
somewhat developers and they tried to use as much of
their skill as they could, and therefore there’s a lot of
code that isn’t similar in nature that should be similar in
nature. 0 0 0This multiplicity of patterns leads to problems
when one developer wants to leverage code by another
developer 0 0 0 [next time] I would try and make sure there
were better templates in place. (Integrator Manager 15,
Project 29, emphasis added)
Analysis of coordination failures across locations in
our sample pointed to the importance of common ground
as embodied by a standardized set of processes across
different development sites. In our sample, coordination
problems occurred in all the nine distributed projects
without uniform coding procedures across locations
and high across location interdependence. For instance,
Projects 10 and 17 suffered from coordination issues
until uniform coding standards were imposed across the
different locations of the same firm. As the manager of
Project 10 told us,
When I took over this project, the project was suf-
fering delays from poor integration of work from our
U.S. and Brazilian centers. Our programmers in the U.S.
had worked in this industry and similar products for
many years; they did not follow a mature process. This
approach severely impacted interaction with the Brazilian
employees. There were several episodes of miscommu-
nication with “this is what I said” and “this is what I
meant” and so on. The first thing I did when I took over
was to bring some of the key Brazilians over to the U.S.
to discuss and agree on processes that both the U.S. and
Brazil would follow. Once the process was nailed down,
I ensured that the U.S. employees followed them. This
was the most important thing to bring the project back
on track. (Integrator Manager 5, Project 10)
It is interesting to contrast within-firm distributed
projects (cell 2) to within-firm, colocated projects
(cell 1). Colocated projects did not emphasize standard-
ized processes or leverage TCMs to the same extent.
Several managers suggested that working to standardized
processes was emphasized more in distributed projects
but not in colocated projects, since, in the latter, ongoing
communication can always resolve coordination issues.
For example,
This team is fully colocated, so anybody could speak with
anybody else at any time—and the weekly meetings hap-
pen in one room when everybody is present. Well within
the last year we have started trying to follow the CMM
code of practice and our centre is at level two, working
on level three. Why do I have to follow that process,
because, you know, we’re all right together? It is more
useful when you have a diverse team across locations.
We are just starting to offshore part of our team, so hav-
ing those processes in place makes that transition easier.
(Integrator Manager 12, Project 22)
In sum, achieving coordination by leveraging TCM
was emphasized only when ongoing communication is
ineffective (as it is in distributed projects).
2. Using common tools to generate common ground.
We also found that distributed projects within firms take
special measures to generate common ground across
locations through tacit means by directly improving the
observability of actions and outcomes. Managers used
tools such as code repositories, version control systems,
and workflow tools to generate common ground regard-
ing the work context, without the need for direct com-
munication between individuals. Technical tools such as
workflow management systems and configuration man-
agement tools help developers from different locations
coordinate by making actions transparent across loca-
tions and by quickly putting the latest developments
across locations in common ground. These tools can be
thought of as creating trading zones that enable develop-
ers across locations to coordinate (Kellogg et al. 2006).
Eighteen of 22 projects organized in cell 2 made an
effort to use common tools across locations to generate
common ground across geographies.
Between-Firm Distributed Projects Did Not Use
TCMs. In 19 out of the 20 cases organized in cell 4,
between-firm coordination was achieved by ongoing
face-to-face communication between employees of dif-
ferent firms. In these 19 projects, coordination across
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locations happened within firms and relied on lever-
aging TCMs. Put differently, in every case in cell 4,
at least one site in a distributed project featured a mix-
ture of employees from different firms. Different firms
might work together, but they did so by colocating their
employees.
To illustrate this, consider a project involving a ven-
dor firm from India providing software services to a
client from the United States, where much of the cod-
ing work is done in India and some is done in New
York. The pattern we found is one in which client
employees in New York rarely interacted directly with
the vendor employees in India, and vice versa. Rather,
the client employees primarily interact with the vendor
on-site team resident in New York by ongoing, face-
to-face communication; i.e., between-firm coordination
between client and vendor employees mainly happens
face-to-face in New York. These on-site vendor employ-
ees located in New York in turn coordinate with their
counterparts in India using TCMs. In other words, we
find that interaction across locations typically happened
within one firm (in this example, within the vendor
for New York–India). We should note that our sam-
ple of cell 4 projects reflects a pattern noted by indus-
try observers—that despite obvious cost savings, ven-
dors in offshore software services projects never reduce
their onshore employee presence to zero (Information
Week 2004). The key question here is why between-firm
distributed projects rely on face-to-face communication
when within-firm distributed projects rely much more
on TCMs.
Finding 3: Between-Firm Coordination in
Distributed Projects Relies on Face-to-Face
Communication Because TCMs Are Not Available
It appears to be much more difficult to rely on TCMs
to achieve coordination between firms across locations,
rather than within firms. As pointed out earlier, in our
sample of 20 cell 4 projects, effectively none used TCM.
This is because individuals in different firms typically
neither have preexisting common ground that they can
leverage nor are they able to tacitly generate such com-
mon ground swiftly.
1. Not working to standardized procedures. As dis-
cussed above in the within-firm case, coordination is
achieved partly by relying on working to standardized
procedures that already exist in common ground within
the firm. However, common procedures typically do not
exist between firms. For example, a manager described
a project (Project 19) that she worked on that had inte-
gration problems, which she attributed to the fact that
the vendor (Integrator) had one set of processes from
another vendor, who had a different set of processes,
both of which were different from the client’s set of
processes. In our sample of 20 projects in cell 4, only
one involved different firms with common, standardized
work procedures.5
2. Not using common tools to generate common
ground. 19 of the 20 projects organized in cell 4, dif-
ferent toolkits were used across firms.6 A manager gave
us an example of the coordination problems that occur
when several vendors are involved and they do not use
a standardized toolkit:
6An7 important headache is the mismatch in the technical
development tool sets that are not shared by multiple ven-
dors on a single project, and the key one that I’ll always
come back to is configuration management. The more
different development groups that you have operating,
the greater the risk that you have that your configura-
tion management is not going to be effective. And rarely
if ever is there a single consolidated configuration man-
agement tool that ensures when a particular module is
checked in by one person and changes are made, that
somebody else isn’t making changes to the same code
sets that will conflict with those when the application is
merged together. (Integrator Manager 10, Project 18)
In other words, our data suggest that TCMs used in the
within-firm case, such as working to standard processes
and using common toolkits, are not available in between-
firm projects.
The lack of TCMs in between-firm contexts results in
coordination problems only in distributed projects. Such
TCMs are also not present in between-firm, colocated
projects (in cell 3). However, similar to cell 1 projects,
cell 3 projects also draw on rich ongoing face-to-face
communication that can swiftly resolve any coordination
problems.
Why Between-Firm Projects Cannot Develop TCMs.
Our evidence suggests that it is not easy to create com-
mon procedures or to force the adoption of common
toolkits across firms. In our sample, several projects
involving multiple firms made an attempt to develop new
joint processes across firms.7 However, this proved to
be very expensive and time consuming. As one manager
told us,
In 6this project7 we had to spend four months creating a
joint methodology and training clients and our employ-
ees in this methodology. This caused a lot of heartburn
among the employees who were more used to doing
things in their own way. Redesigning all the templates,
communicating it to the teams, and ensuring they were
followed was very difficult. (Process Master Manager 2,
Project 4)
Another manager nicely summed up the various
issues:
6When working with client developers7 the processes are
the same, we will share our templates with them. 0 0 0
We have to discuss with them, they are not aware of our
processes, we have to educate them, this is how it is,
this is how we do things 0 0 0 it is a bit of a burden to do
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this 0 0 0we have to carry them along and educate them,
and buffers must be built in the project to accommodate
this. If the project is aggressive, we suggest that we don’t
take them 6client developers7.
To me, what matters is the whole methodology, which
is used in that context is agreed upon by both the client
personnel and our personnel, that is a critical issue. I can-
not have the client personnel participating if they can-
not follow. There were some instances where somebody
6from our client7 would not be following the template and
write their own code, but in those instances we need a
clear protocol, like who do you report to and how to get
it done, who has authority. (Process Master Manager 32,
Project 60)
The main reason why common processes and tech-
nologies are difficult to create and use between firms
appears to be the absence of a unified authority in such
contexts (e.g., ultimately the chief executive officer of
the firm and her delegates). Authority denotes a supe-
rior’s legitimate ability to demand obedient behavior
from a group of subordinates within a specified realm of
actions (Weber 1921/1978). This exists if subordinates
accept the decision of their superior without indepen-
dently examining the merits of that decision (Barnard
1938, Simon 1947). There are multiple possible sources
of authority; the employment contract is a salient one
within firms (Simon 1947, Williamson 1975).
We find instances in our data of the role of authority
in (a) selecting a standard operating procedure for inclu-
sion in common ground from among competing alter-
natives, thus guaranteeing a speedy and widely agreed
choice rather than a necessarily optimal one; (b) main-
taining and protecting it against the usual organiza-
tional changes arising from turnover, local adaptation, or
growth for instance, through an emphasis on documen-
tation and dissemination of standards; and (c) enforcing
it by ensuring compliance to it when individual incen-
tives may conflict—such as when developers do not wish
to adhere to firmwide standards because it is a cost to
them to switch from their existing ad hoc practices to
the firmwide ones.
The role of authority in enforcing a process or in
adoption of a technology is most obvious:
When someone is not following the processes, we need
the ability to remedy the situation. Also, 6the vendor7 on-
site team will “hear” 6the vendor7 offshore team better.
For example, if 6the vendor7 offshore has some particu-
lar requirement that eases its work, 6the vendor7 on-site
will provide it that way—the offshore and on-site leads
will ensure it, but the client employee will not. (Process
Master Manager 4, Project 8)
Adler (2005) discusses this aspect in his analysis of
CMM adoption by developers. Similarly, different firms
have different technology profiles, having made exten-
sive investments in software licenses, training, etc., and
authority is required to enforce a shift.
Authority may also be useful in agreeing on a com-
mon work process. Another manager provided us with
the following example:
One example was how we were doing data warehousing,
and there were two different models, and there was a
lot of fighting on these two different models 6within the
vendor7, and I ended up intervening and doing a pros
and cons assessment, to weigh the two alternatives, and I
ended up having to say, based on this analysis, this is the
direction we’re going, and at this point, I don’t care if it
is technically the right solution, no more arguing about
it. (Integrator Manager 28, Project 53)
This suggests that there exist circumstances in which
coordination on a (possibly inferior) choice may be bet-
ter than a continued search for an optimal choice or
uncoordinated adoption of different choices. In these sit-
uations, authority is useful even if it merely enables
a (perhaps arbitrary) common choice (Conner and
Prahalad 1996).
Although it is possible to conceive giving managers
in one firm authority over employees in another (e.g.,
Stinchcombe 1985), in practice this seems problem-
atic in our context. One manager from Process Mas-
ter spoke about how she had (in principle) authority
over project matters, even over client developers, but the
client manager has authority on other matters. She, how-
ever, admitted that she rarely approached client person-
nel with criticism of their work but always raised it with
the client manager, who “hopefully took some action”
(Process Master Manager 2, Project 4).
In our context, as well as more generally, there are
typically asymmetric costs to firms in adopting the same
standards or technologies, such as CMM processes or a
new set of software licenses and the required training.
Vendors typically have more advanced processes than
clients (because of specialization), but clients have bar-
gaining power to attempt to minimize disruption to their
organizations. This is precisely the situation of “coor-
dinated adaptation” that Williamson (1991) discusses,
where each party has an incentive to create and interpret
standards that are advantageous to itself. Although the
problem of asymmetric costs of adoption may exist even
within a firm, a source of common authority makes it
easier to enforce adoption (Williamson 1991).
In sum, in spatially distributed settings, TCMs are
important to achieving coordination, since ICT-based
ongoing communication is usually ineffective. Within-
firm projects are more likely to use TCMs than
are between-firm projects, because the availability of
shared authority within firms makes it easier to lever-
age preexisting common ground and to tacitly gener-
ate de novo common ground. This explains the need
for a costly on-site presence in offshore outsourcing.
Together, these findings suggest a potential explanation
for why some prior studies find within-firm coordination
to be distinct and advantageous (in distributed settings),
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but others find no difference in between- versus within-
firm coordination (in colocated settings).
Alternative Explanations. Alternative explanations
take the form of possible unobserved differences in the
nature of projects across cells in Figure 1 that may have
led us to erroneously attribute differences in observed
coordination mechanisms to the organizational forms
involved. Although we are unable to offer statistical evi-
dence for or against such alternative explanations, we do
believe that our data still allow us some confidence in
our conclusions. Our sample includes projects of differ-
ent sizes and complexity in each of the cells. This helps
us to address such questions as whether it is possible that
between-firm projects are less likely to rely on TCMs
because they are larger or more complex, on average,
than within-firm projects.
Our data suggest that distributed projects are not
smaller or simpler—from a technical and business pers-
pective—than colocated projects, nor are between-firm
projects smaller or simpler than within-firm projects.
Table 3 shows the distribution of projects by size and
complexity. In our sample, heterogeneity in size and
complexity does not account for the difference in coor-
dination mechanisms used or in the nature of interde-
pendence observed in between- and within-firm projects.
In distributed projects, within-firm coordination occurs
by leveraging TCM, and between-firm coordination
mainly happens face-to-face at the firm interface, regard-
less of size or complexity of the projects (though we had
no instances of small projects in cell 4 in our sample).
In our sample, project complexity does not appear
to materially change the nature of coordination mech-
anisms used.8 We have data on 19 complex and 11
less complex projects in the within-firm organization
and 24 complex and 6 less complex projects in the
between-firm organization. However, both less complex
and complex projects emphasize ongoing communica-
tion in the colocated case and TCMs in the distributed
settings for within-firm projects and ongoing commu-
nication for coordinating between firms in distributed
projects. Reading Table 2 in conjunction with Table 3,
the overwhelming pattern suggests that the choice of
coordination mechanisms is not driven primarily by size
or complexity.
Table 3 Distribution of Project Size and Complexity
Project size
Location model Small Medium Large Total
Multiple (42)
High complexity 0 7 26 33
Low complexity 3 6 0 9
Single (18)
High complexity 2 4 4 10
Low complexity 2 3 3 8
Total 7 20 33 60
Discussion
In perfectly competitive markets, prices serve as signals
that obviate the need for individual actors to consciously
coordinate their activities with each other. As long as
each actor responds to price, the system as a whole is
coordinated (Hayek 1945, Williamson 1975). In con-
trast, activities are coordinated under a unified source
of authority within the firm (Coase 1937). However, to
the extent that a large quantity of economic activity lies
in the “swollen middle” between markets and hierar-
chies (Bradach and Eccles 1989, Hennart 1993), it is
important to understand how coordination mechanisms
work within versus between firms. In this paper, we use
qualitative data to explore a simple question about these
coordination mechanisms: (When) do within-firm trans-
actions rely on unique coordination mechanisms that are
not available in between-firm transactions?
Our findings can be summarized as follows: First, for
colocated projects, the same coordination mechanisms
are used within firms and between firms. Second, for
spatially distributed projects, tacit coordination mecha-
nisms are used within firms but not between firms. Third,
the reason that TCMs are not used between firms on dis-
tributed projects even though they would be helpful is
because of the lack of history of shared experience and
lack of enforcement through authority.
Implications for Theory
Our findings indicate that it may be difficult to rely
on TCMs to achieve coordination in between-firm set-
tings because there is typically little preexisting common
ground between firms, and it may not be as easy to build
without ongoing communication. In contrast, within-firm
projects can draw on such preexisting common ground
as well as use technologies that enable rapid buildup of
common ground even under communication constraints.
This suggests that organizing activities within one firm
rather than across the boundaries of firms may perhaps
be advantageous in situations where there are significant
constraints on both ongoing communication and modu-
larization.
The information processing theory of organizations
suggests that highly interdependent activities be orga-
nized in semiautonomous units; this is the guiding prin-
ciple underlying grouping and linking in firms (Galbraith
1977, Thompson 1967, Tushman and Nadler 1978),
as well as the use of modularity as an organizing
principle (Sanchez and Mahoney 1996, Simon 1962).
This is because grouping has the advantage of coor-
dinating tight interdependence by recourse to feedback
or ongoing communication. However, this work does
not address the problem of coordinating when ongo-
ing communication is ineffective. Our argument is that
interdependence alone may not suffice to give within-
firm coordination the advantage; indeed, the voluminous
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work on buyer-supplier relationships in numerous indus-
tries, including aircraft, automobiles, engineering ser-
vices, and IT, shows clearly that highly interdependent
work is performed quite often across firm boundaries
(Argyres 1999, Dyer 2000, Helper et al. 2000, Kotha
and Srikanth 2013, Kraut and Streeter 1995, Nishiguchi
1994). In our sample, we find high interdependencies
in interfirm as well as intrafirm projects (see Figure 2),
and no differences in how interdependent work is coor-
dinated between or within firms when the actors are
colocated (i.e., when they face no communication con-
straints).
However, when high interdependence is coupled with
communication constraints, intrafirm coordination may
indeed hold some advantages. Our finding is that within-
firm work can be coordinated using TCMs by relying
on the preexisting stock of common ground when both
modularity and ongoing communication are constrained,
but this is typically not feasible in the between-firm case.
Our research provides several possible explanations
for why we might observe a qualitative change in the
stock of preexisting common ground at the boundaries
of the firm. Common ground refers to shared knowl-
edge of first and higher orders (i.e., knowledge that is
shared, known to be shared, known to be known to be
shared; Clark 1996). Such knowledge is more likely to
be available within firms than between them because
there is likely to be greater history of shared experience
within the firm, as well as greater likelihood that com-
mon ground is actively managed and enforced through
authority. For example, in our setting, coordination based
on standardized procedures appears to be effective only
because everyone in the firm knows about these proce-
dures and adheres to them in their work, and everyone
knows that everyone knows these procedures, and so
on. In addition, everyone knows that any violation will
be corrected through application of authority, and there-
fore common adherence can be reliably expected. Put
differently, common ground arises in part from shared
experience—but authority is another important source
for the de novo generation as well as for preservation of
common ground, including common ground generated
by shared experience. To the extent that the authority to
select, maintain, and enforce common ground is more
likely within a firm rather than between firms, this pro-
vides a possible explanation as to why the level of com-
mon ground may be qualitatively different within rather
than between firms. We believe that these insights about
authority and coordination are a valuable complement to
those of Adler and Borys (1996) and Adler (2005), who
point to conditions under which employees view author-
ity as enabling or coercive. These insights also comple-
ment the findings of Kotha and Srikanth (2013), who
suggest that authority may be important to providing the
incentives required to generate common ground and may
be an impetus for vertically integrating previously out-
sourced activities. In contrast, tacit coordination across
firms may be possible without the presence of common
authority when investments are made in generating com-
mon ground across them, such as investments in com-
mon IT systems that can serve as a “technical grammar”
(see Argyres 1999) or systems that increase observability
of actions across firms (see Kotha and Srikanth 2013).
If the common ground available to employees within
a firm is shaped by its history and exercise of a common
source of authority, this would explain why two firms
with no prior history of working together or without
shared authority structures are unlikely to have signifi-
cant levels of common ground beyond what is available
through hiring of employees from common professions
(e.g., science, law, engineering). On the other hand,
a series of repeated interactions should help to build
common ground between firms. For example, Mayer
and Argyres (2004) show that over repeated interac-
tions, firms develop a stock of common ground, which
becomes codified in their contracts. This does not, how-
ever, imply that this condition will ever be equivalent, let
alone superior, to the stock of common ground created
within a firm for a similar period of repeated interaction.
This is because of the presence of authority in the latter
but not the former case, which facilitates investment in
and enforcement of common ground (Monteverde 1995,
Williamson 1985).
Limitations and Suggestions for Future Research
First, we note the inherent limitations of our method,
which lends itself to inductive insight but not gen-
eralization. We chose our industry, software services
offshoring, for reasons of appropriateness rather than
representativeness (Yin 1994). Similarly, both the firms
that we chose to study and the cases for interviews
were selected based on our sampling criteria (Yin 1994),
rather than because they were representative of the
industry. Although we do present some comparative data
and examine a large number of cases, they may not
be representative of all projects. We can state, however,
that our data reproduces a well-known pattern in the
industry—that projects distributed across multiple firms
and multiple locations are organized such that some
employees from both the client and vendor firms are
colocated in at least one location.
Our data on past projects may also be subject to hind-
sight bias on the part of our informants. However, we
tried to mitigate this risk by asking specific questions
relating to specific projects rather than asking managers
to make general statements based on their experience.
Our reliance on single interviewer responses regarding
the project may suggest bias on the part of the respon-
dent. However, we believe our conclusions are very
likely robust to such bias, since we see a convergent pat-
tern across different kinds of projects performed by two
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different organizations—a pattern that is less likely to
emerge if there is significant bias. We emphasize that our
conclusions are not based on the responses of one man-
ager but based on the responses of 32 managers from
two different firms, with respect to 60 different projects.
The findings of this paper represent the common thread
among all responses and therefore are likely less prone
to individual biases.
Finally, this research does not present evidence of cau-
sation; from our respondents’ views, we distill an expla-
nation for why vendors never reduce onshore presence
to zero (because of the need for TCMs and the availabil-
ity of TCMs internally, but not between firms). We also
provide some evidence to explain why we prefer our
explanation to alternatives, but this is not necessarily con-
clusive; statistical analysis of large-sample data is needed
to test the mechanisms that we highlight in this study.
While acknowledging these limitations, we also wish
to point to some of the strengths of this study. First, this
is one of very few studies that examine coordination both
within and across firms and that address the important
contingency of whether projects are colocated or spa-
tially distributed; in our setting, we are able to observe
firms making near-simultaneous choices of coordina-
tion mechanisms, within versus between-firm bound-
aries, and we are able to address why these choices
are different. The difficulty in coordinating across mul-
tiple locations makes this choice important even within
firms, thus making comparisons within versus across
firm and location boundaries meaningful rather than
trivial. This comparison makes explicit the colocation–
distribution contingency, which can explain the appar-
ent contradiction in prior empirical work regarding the
core claim of the KBV that within-firm transactions
can draw on unique coordination mechanisms not avail-
able in between-firm transactions. Second, this study
points both to the conditions under which within-firm
exchange uses unique coordination mechanisms relative
to between-firm exchange, as well as to why this differ-
ence may exist.
Conclusions
For the knowledge-based view to offer a distinctive yet
viable perspective on firms, it is necessary to explain
under what conditions firms may possess advantages in
coordinating activities within their boundaries, as well
as what these advantages may be. This study is one
of the few to systematically compare the various coor-
dination mechanisms used in within- and between-firm
projects directly, rather than compare outcomes such as
knowledge transfer (Kogut and Zander 1993) or quality
of integration (Gulati et al. 2005). Our findings suggest
that differences in within- versus between-firm coordi-
nation are most visible under conditions of high inter-
dependence and significant communication constraints.
Under such circumstances—and the offshoring of soft-
ware services is merely one instance—it may be easier
to build or leverage preexisting common ground within
the firm. This advantage may be traceable ultimately to
the existence of shared experience and shared authority
within the boundaries of a firm. Recognizing and fur-
ther understanding the role of authority in generating
and maintaining common ground is likely to be a fruitful
avenue for further research into understanding the firm
as a coordination system.
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Appendix. Interview Guide
The sampling strategy involved software development/
maintenance projects that fall into each of the four cells iden-
tified in Figure 1 to enable comparisons across them.
We began interviews by telling our respondents, “Please
think of two specific projects you managed—they should be
in two different cells in the above figure.” We then led them
through a series of questions listed below for Projects 1 and 2.
The questions center on key “coordination episodes” in the
life of a project:
1. Deciding on the appropriate architecture for this project.
2. The development phase of the project when the main
functionalities were developed.
3. Change management and resolution, especially those
episodes that led to significant departures from prior designs
and work plans (including bug fixing and service disruptions).
Project Characteristics
1. Size and complexity of project, number of stakeholders.
2. Distribution of project staff among locations and by
function.
3. Experience of client and vendor teams with projects
of this type, with the technology and business requirements
(some measure of how novel the project is).
4. Project organization chart (reporting relations as well as
affiliations).
5. Brief stick diagram of the principal components of the
project, the main systems, and the interfaces.
6. The above is the engagement model. How was this cho-
sen? What were the rules, handbooks, etc., that were taken
into account in making this decision?
Coordination Mechanisms—Modularization
1. How is the decision regarding the (modular) architecture
made? Who are the participants?
2. What are the principal concerns that go into this deci-
sion?
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3. Any tools and techniques, rules of thumb, etc., that are
utilized in deciding the architecture?
4. How did the architecture chosen impact the resources
available for the project (in terms of location, training, tech-
nologies, etc.)?
5. To what extent is the architecture decision constrained
by nontechnical considerations (political, economies of reuse,
contractual, etc.)? If there exists several equally valid archi-
tectures, how do you choose between them?
6. How much effort goes into deciding the architecture as
against ongoing coordination? In hindsight, how would you
change the architecture?
Ongoing Coordination
1. Coordination mechanisms employed in the development
phase of the project—how does a developer ensure that her
component will fit in well with the overall system?
2. How does the developer ensure that her code does not
“break” someone else’s code?
3. How are the major functionalities split across teams or
locations? How do the developers normally interact, within
teams and across teams?
4. What are the project communication mechanisms—
examples, projectwide meetings, weekly staff meetings, etc.?
Tools and Artifacts
1. What are the processes and procedures in place to
ensure coordination—such as roles, designated members with
expertise/ownership, rules of engagement, rules of escalation,
processes to get commitment, conventions on standards, inter-
faces, programming guidelines, etc.?
2. What are the tools and artifacts used in coordination—
including automated software tools such as code checkers, ver-
sion control, data managers, workflow tools, etc.?
3. In your opinion, how do tools help in developing soft-
ware on budget and on schedule?
4. Could you describe projects where access to tools versus
a lack of them made a difference in project performance?
Change Management
1. Coordination mechanisms employed in change mana-
gement—process of change identification and incorporation in
project plan.
2. Process of coordination between analysts and developers
impacted by change.
3. Specifically, what tools and artifacts are specific to such
change management episodes than for initial development?
4. How was it accomplished (buffering, slack, negotia-
tion, etc.)?
Changes in Engagement Model
1. How exactly do you think colocation of the teams helps?
In your judgment, what are the advantages of having all devel-
opers for this project work in a single site?
2. How would you change the coordination mechanisms
above if the project were distributed (colocated)?
3. What is the advantage of having everyone from a single
firm? How would you change the project if everyone was from
your firm (or some from another firm)?
Performance
1. Was the project on budget? If not, how much overage or
underage?
2. Was the project on schedule? If not, how much over or
under target?
3. How satisfied was the client firm with the project?
4. How satisfied was your (vendor) firm with the project?
Miscellaneous
1. How are processes used in the project? How are they
updated?
2. Any details on interesting coordination mishaps or
mishap avoidance from respondents experience.
Endnotes
1Note that this critique is quite independent of the question of
whether the knowledge-based perspective, even if its premises
were true, could claim to provide an alternative, sufficient
explanation of firms as systems of asset ownership, even if this
perspective does successfully explain the existence of employ-
ment contracts, as Foss (1996b) points out.
2Actions may also be coordinated unconsciously, as when each
adapts individually to an environment that happens to include
the other. Organisms coevolving in an ecology display such a
property. The emergence of routines as a by-product of indi-
vidual adaptation by interdependent agents is another instance.
3Adler (2005) provides a very good introduction to
CMM for organizational scholars. Very briefly, CMM is a
documentation-centric process framework that regulates activ-
ities in software development. CMM provides best practices
regarding what activities should be performed; the instantia-
tion of CMM—how these activities are actually performed—is
specific to each firm.
4We note that standardized processes themselves, such as
CMM, may be explicit knowledge. However, when such
explicit knowledge is available in common ground, this
enables tacit coordination.
5The exception is a project where the client hired a large num-
ber of developers from the vendor, who in turn then coordi-
nated with the vendor from the client side.
6The exception was a very ambitious project, and the project
manager lobbied to specially obtain resources to implement a
standardized global tool kit across all locations.
7Attempts were also made in colocated projects, as the vendor
managers suggested “at the insistence of the clients.” This was
typically seen as an opportunity by the client to upgrade their
processes, but they did not adopt the vendor processes whole-
sale; they attempted to fine-tune them to what they regarded
as their unique needs.
8Complexity was rated on technical and business dimensions
by the project managers.
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